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   1 
COMPARING REGIONAL INTEGRATION SCHEMES: 
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES OR WOULD-BE POLITIES 
 
 
Introduction
1 
 
The different integration schemes in the world vary in various ways. They vary in functional 
scope, institutional set-up, size of membership and impact. The different factors used to explain 
this variance also vary, from economic gains over geopolitics to learning processes and creation 
of new collective identities. 
 
If the integration schemes in different parts of the world are so different, are they all sui 
generis? Does it make sense to compare them? Some scholars have argued that they have enough 
common traits to be comparable. Most often at least integration schemes try to create freer trade, 
if not free trade, between the participating states. Many also try to create freer movement for 
services and capital. One possible way to look at this is to say that they constitute international 
regimes, i.e. establish principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which 
actors’ expectations converge.
2 A good example of an international regime would be the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), now part of the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
But, as we shall see, one can argue that at least the European Union (EU) has gone beyond being 
an international regime, instead becoming a multi-level political system or polity. 
 
Although much integration theory has been developed to explain the European case, 
integration theory has also been used to study integration in other parts of the world, including 
the Americas. In this paper we shall discuss some theories that may be useful in comparing the 
EU, NAFTA and Mercosur as well as other integration schemes. 
 
 
The Concept of International Integration 
 
When early theories of integration were developed there was much discussion in the literature on 
how to define the concept. It was for instance discussed whether integration refers to a process or to 
an end product. Of course the two can be combined. Integration could then be defined as a process 
that leads to a certain state of affairs. Karl Deutsch, for instance, defined integration as “the 
attainment, within a territory, of a ‘sense of community’ and of institutions and practices strong 
enough and widespread enough to assure, for a ‘long’ time, dependable expectations of ‘peaceful 
change’ among its population.” When a group of people or states have been integrated this way they 
constitute a “security community.” Amalgamation, on the other hand, was used by Deutsch and his 
                                                           
1 This paper is an extended version of paper presented in Miami at conference on the European Union and the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, March 31 – April 1, 2003. It relies on earlier writings by the author, in particular 
the introductory and concluding chapters from Finn Laursen (ed.), Comparative Regional Integration: Theoretical 
Perspectives (Ashgate, forthcoming). 
2 Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” in Stephen 
Krasner (ed).), International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 1-21.   2 
collaborators to refer to “the formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a 
single larger unit, with some type of common government.”
3 
 
  Early efforts to study regional integration mainly concentrated on the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) from 1951 and the European Economic Community (EEC) from 1957. In 
Ernst Haas's classical study of the ECSC, The Uniting of Europe, integration was defined as: 
  
  … the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their 
loyalties, expectation and political activities to a new center whose institutions possess or demand 
jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.
4 
 
In Leon Lindberg's study of the early EEC, The Political Dynamics of European Economic 
Integration, integration was defined without reference to an end point: 
 
  ... political integration is (1) the process whereby nations forgo the desire and ability to conduct 
foreign and key domestic policies independently of each other, seeking instead to make joint decisions 
or to delegate the decision-making process to new central organs; and (2) the process whereby 
political actors in several distinct settings are persuaded to shift their expectations and political 
activities to a new center.
5 
 
Lindberg considered his own concept of integration more cautious than that of Haas. Central to it 
was “the development of devices and processes for arriving at collective decisions by means other 
than autonomous action by national governments.”
6  It seems fair to say that some joint or collective 
decision-making is an important aspect of all regional integration efforts. This decision-making can 
cover a varying number of functional areas (scope), and the decision-making process can be more or 
less efficient and the common institutions established can be more or less adequate (institutional 
capacity).  
  
  What then explains changes in functional scope and institutional capacity of regional 
integration efforts? This is the central question in integration theory. Ernst Haas developed the 
concept of spill-over, which was also applied by Lindberg. According to Lindberg, 
 
  ... "spill-over" refers to a situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation 
in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create a further 
condition and a need for more action, and so forth.
7 
 
Haas saw the EEC as spill-over from the ECSC. He talked about “the expansive logic of sector 
integration.” He predicted that the process would continue in the EEC. Liberalisation of trade within 
the customs union would lead to harmonisation of general economic policies and eventually spill-
over into political areas and lead to the creation of some kind of political community.
8   
                                                           
3 Karl W. Deutsch, et al (eds.), Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the 
Light of Historical Experience (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 5-6. 
4 Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces 1950-1957 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1958), p. 16. 
5 Leon N. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1963), p. 6. 
6 Ibid, p. 5. 
7 Ibid, p. 10. 
8 Haas, The Uniting of Europe, p. 311.   3 
 
  When the European integration process experienced a crisis in the mid-1960s, however, 
many scholars concluded that Haas' early theory had been too deterministic. This included Haas 
himself, who now admitted that he had not foreseen “a rebirth of nationalism and anti-functional 
high politics.” A revised theory would have to take account of “dramatic-political” aims of 
statesmen such as General de Gaulle.
9 
 
  In a much-quoted article Stanley Hoffmann argued that the national situations and role 
perceptions were still rather diverse within the European Communities (EC). In general he argued: 
 
  Every international system owes its inner logic and its unfolding to the diversity of domestic 
determinants, geo-historical situations, and outside aims among its units.
10 
 
So he contrasted the logic of integration with a logic of diversity. The latter sets limits to the degree 
to which the 'spill-over' process can operate. “It restricts the domain in which the logic of functional 
integration operates to the area of welfare.” Hoffmann advanced the suggestion that “in areas of key 
importance to the national interest, nations prefer the certainty, or the self-controlled uncertainty, of 
national self-reliance, to the uncontrolled uncertainty” of integration.
11 
 
 
Adapting Neo-functionalism: European Integration Revisited 
 
The feeling that early theory had seen the process as too automatic led to various efforts to 
reformulate integration theory. The effort by Lindberg and Scheingold in the book Europe's Would-
Be Polity deserves special mentioning.
12 Lindberg and Scheingold now studied the EC as a political 
system, where inputs in the form of demands, support and leadership are transformed into outputs in 
the form of policies and decisions. They added three integration mechanisms to that of spill-over 
already developed by Haas, namely (a) log-rolling and side-payments, i.e. bargaining exchanges 
designed to “gain assent of more political actors to a particular proposal or package of proposals,” 
(b) actor socialization, i.e. the process whereby the “participants in the policy-making process, from 
interest groups to bureaucrats and statesmen, begin to develop new perspectives, loyalties, and 
identifications as a result of their mutual interactions,” and (c) feedback, which mainly refers to the 
impact of outputs on the attitudes and behaviour of the public at large. If the public finds the output 
from the system good and relevant, support for the system is expected to increase. 
 
 Integration  was  seen  as a political process by Lindberg and Scheingold. On the demand side 
various domestic groups have expectations and lobby the governments for certain outcomes. On the 
supply side coalition formation and leadership are seen as central aspects of the process. To get 
decisions through the system you must have the support of various groups and individual decision-
makers. This is where the role of the independent Commission was seen as important in the EC. The 
                                                           
9 Ernst B. Haas, “The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 
Vol. 5, 1967, pp. 315-343. 
10 Stanley Hoffman, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe,” 
Daedalus, Vol. 95 (Summer 1966), p. 864. 
11 Ibid, p. 882. 
12 Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, Europe’s Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European 
Community (Englewood-Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970).   4 
Commission can actively try to build coalitions to overcome national resistance to new policies and 
decisions, i.e. exercise supranational leadership. 
 
 
Game-Theoretic Perspectives 
 
Regional integration efforts can also be seen as an effort to overcome a fundamental problem in the 
relations among sovereign states, namely that of defection. According to classical international law 
states are sovereign. They do not have to accept supranational authorities. They can of course 
conclude agreements with each other, bilaterally or multilaterally; but once they find that conditions 
have changed, they are no longer bound by such agreements. And they may be tempted to cheat to 
gain more for themselves than their partners. So international agreements and cooperation efforts 
can be fragile and unstable as long as they are based on the classical notion of sovereignty. 
 
  Modern game theory discusses this in a formal deductive fashion. The famous Prisoners' 
Dilemma game illustrates the situation where individually rational actors, which could be states, 
arrive at sub-optimal outcomes if they act independently. Further, the theory shows that agreements, 
which should realise optimal outcomes, will often be unstable because actors will be tempted to 
cheat or defect from the cooperative agreement to realise outcomes that are better for themselves in 
the short run.
13 
 
Figure 1. Prisoners’ Dilemma 
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13 Steven J. Brams, Game Theory and Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1975); Arthur A. Stein, Why Nations 
Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
1990); Michael Taylor, The Possibility of Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).   5 
The Prisoners’ Dilemma (figure 1) can be depicted as a dilemma between co-operation and 
defection. In its simplest version there are two actors, A and B. Each has to decide between two 
possible strategies. The values in the matrix are the payoffs for A and B respectively. So the first 
value is the outcome for Actor A, and the second value is for Actor B. In a one-shot game A is 
expected to choose the defection strategy because the payoff will be best irrespective of what B 
decides. The same goes for B, and the collective outcome will be 2,2, which is sub optimal (or 
Pareto inferior). The optimal outcome, 3,3, can be reached through co-operation, but will be 
unstable because each actor can gain by defecting (or cheating). It may therefore take a good 
international regime, possibly including sanctions in order to avoid defection.  
 
  Post-war efforts at international cooperation among industrialized countries in the economic 
area can be seen as a response to the protectionism - and beggar-thy-neighbour policies - of the 
1930s. Free trade, it can be argued, will normally be in everybody's interest. Yet, it is not easy to 
realize. The states tried through the GATT to facilitate and increase international trade. Yet, trade 
conflicts have remained an important aspect of relations among the industrialized countries.
14 
  
The experience of the EC is instructive in this respect. The EC is first of all a customs 
union, which should realise free trade among its members (and introduce a common tariff 
towards third countries). But once the customs union was in place (1968) it gradually became 
clear that a customs union is not sufficient to realize free trade. Member States could continue to 
protect their national industries through non-tariff barriers to trade (NTBs). Some of these were 
technical barriers to trade like different national standards for products.
15 
  
  A number of curious cases followed. Many of these eventually were taken to the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ), which called the bluff. There were cases like the French alcoholic drink 
Cassis de Dijon, which could not be exported to the Federal Republic of Germany because it did not 
have the alcohol content required by German law; pasta which could not be exported to Italy 
because it was made of soft wheat instead of durum wheat; bread that could not be exported to the 
Netherlands because it did not have the salt content required by Dutch law, etc., etc. The ECJ played 
an important role in stopping this and in enunciating the principle of ‘mutual recognition of 
standards.’ 
  
  The EC’s Internal Market project of the late 1980s can be seen as a renewed effort to 
overcome Prisoners' Dilemma situations. In the Single European Act (SEA) the Member States 
accepted the use of qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council of Ministers to complete the 
Internal Market. The Commission under Jacques Delors also played a leadership role. 
  
                                                           
14 Joseph M. Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1990); John A.C. Conybeare, Trade Wars: The Theory and Practice of 
International Commercial Rivalry (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Robert Gilpin, The Political 
Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987). 
15 Jacques Pelkmans and Alan Winters, Europe’s Domestic Market (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
1988).     6 
  These elements of an independent Commission and QMV add up to what could be called 
supranationality.
16 The Commission is an independent European body; it is there to represent and 
further the European interest. National interests are represented in the Council (of Ministers); but to 
the extent that QMV is accepted in the Council, no single member can stop the adoption of 
measures they do not like. One of the problems of traditional intergovernmental cooperation, and 
the concomitant rule of unanimity, is that the slowest members will determine the speed. Under 
such form of cooperation one should expect decisions to be based on the lowest common 
denominator. The EC on the other hand has created institutions that facilitate the “upgrading of the 
common interest.”
17  
  
  Another important institutional element in the EU is the ECJ which makes binding 
decisions. Community law is different from traditional international law. It has primacy if it 
conflicts with national law; and much EC legislation has direct effect.
18 
  
  If we compare the EU with other regional integration organizations some of these 
institutional differences become apparent. None of the other regional schemes have created 
independent supranational bodies like the EC Commission; none of them have accepted anything 
resembling Community law and real limits on their sovereignty in the form of binding majority 
decisions.
19 In the EC there has been a pooling and delegation of sovereignty. According to 
Moravcsik this is done to assure ‘credible commitments.’
20  
  
  Integration is not only about getting optimal outcomes. There is also an element of 
redistribution in integration schemes. The game that can illustrate this is the Battle of the Sexes. 
Whereas the question about efficiency is the question of reaching the Pareto-frontier, the question of 
distribution is the question of where you end up on the Pareto-frontier. An element of power enters 
the equation. Whereas liberal institutionalists scholars have looked at efficiency, realists and neo-
realists have emphasized the question of power.
21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
16 Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, “institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s,” in Robert O. Keohane 
and Stanley Hoffmann (eds.), The New European community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1991), pp. 1-39. 
17 Ernst B. Haas, ‘International Integration: The European and the Universal Process,” International Organization, 
Vol. 15(4), 1967, pp. 366-392. 
18 Jean-Victor Louis, The Community Legal Order (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, 1990). 
19 See also Werner J. Feld and Gavin Boyd (eds.), Comparative Regional Systems: West and East Europe, North 
America, The Middle East, nd Developing Countries (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980); Joseph Jamar, 
Intégrations régionales entre pays en voie de développement (Bruges: De Tempel, Tempelhof, 1982). 
20 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1998). 
21 Stephen D. Krasner, “Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier,” World Politics 
43 (April 1991), pp. 336-366.   7 
Figure 2.  The Battle of the Sexes 
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The Battle of the Sexes (Figure 2) is often illustrated by a couple going on holiday. What happens if 
the male partner prefers the mountains and the female partner prefers to go to the beach? If the 
greater part of the holiday is spent in the mountain the male partner will have won the little power 
game. This game can also be illustrated as different points on the Pareto frontier (see figure 3), 
where 3½, 3½ is the perfect compromise. 
 
Figure 3. Pareto Frontier 
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  In the following we shall take a closer look at two recent contributions to integration theory, 
namely the contributions by Moravcsik and Mattli. Both suggest models that are rather simple and 
useful for understanding regional integration. 
 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
 
When Andrew Moravcsik developed his approach to the study of European integration, ‘liberal 
intergovernmentalism,’ he proposed a two-step analysis of integration, first national preference 
formation, then interstate bargaining.
22 Later he added a third step, institutional choice.
23 The model 
is simple and could be used to study integration in other parts of the world than Europe. The 
framework is summarized in table 1.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
22 Andrew Moravcsik, “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmental 
Approach,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 31(4), 1993, pp. 473-523. 
23 Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, 1998.   9 
Table 1: International cooperation: A rationalist framework 
_______________________________________________________________________________
___ 
Stages  of     National   Interstate   Institutional 
Negotiation   Preference   Bargaining   Choice 
  F o r m a t i o n  
_______________________________________________________________________________
___ 
Alternative    What is the source  Given national   Given substantive 
independent   of  underlying   preferences   agreement,  what 
variables   national    what explains the  explains the transfer 
underlying   preferences?   efficiency  and   of  sovereignty  to 
each stage     distributional  outcomes international 
    of  interstate  bargaining?  Institutions? 
 
 
  Economic   Asymmetrical   Federalist  ideology 
  interests   interdependence           or 
          or              or    Centralized 
  Geopolitical   Supranational   technocratic 
  interests?   entrepreneurship?  management 
                        or 
      M o r e   c r e d i b l e  
      c o m m i t m e n t ?  
 
 
 
Observed   Underlying   Agreements   Choice  to 
outcomes at   national  on  substance   delegate 
each stage   preferences     or  pool 
      d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  
      in  international 
      institutions 
Source. Moravcsik (1998), p. 24. 
 
 
 
  The first stage is to try to explain national preference. The central question asked by 
Moravcsik here is whether it is economic or geopolitical interests that dominate. The answer based 
on major decisions in the European integration process is that economic interests are most 
important.  
  
  The second stage, interstate bargaining, seeks to explain the efficiency and distributional 
outcomes. Here two possible explanations of agreements on substance are contrasted: asymmetrical 
interdependence or supranational entrepreneurship. Moravcsik arrives at the answer that 
asymmetrical interdependence has most explanatory power.   10  
 
  The third stage explores the reasons why states choose to delegate or pool decision-making 
in international institutions. Delegation in the EU refers to the powers given to the Commission and 
the ECJ. Pooling of sovereignty refers to the application of majority decisions. To explain 
institutional choice Moravcsik contrasts three possible explanations: Federalist ideology, centralized 
technocratic management or more credible commitment. The answer is that states delegate and pool 
sovereignty to get more credible commitment. 
  
  Using theories of decision-making, negotiations and international political economy in an 
elegant combination has allowed Moravcsik to construct a simple framework for the study of 
international cooperation, including international integration. 
  
  In the last chapter in The Choice for Europe Moravcsik suggests that his study has 
implications for International Relations theory in general and that it could be used to study regional 
integration in other parts of the world than Europe. In a brief discussion he mainly looks at regional 
trade dependency as the underlying factor explaining the demand for integration. We reproduce the 
table he includes (Table 2). 
 
 
Table 2: Regional trade dependence of Germany, United States, and Japan as proportion of 
GNP, 1958 and 1990. 
    Intra-  Intra-  Intra- 
    Regional  regional Industry 
    Trade/GDP  Trade/GDP  Trade/Regional 
    (1960)  (1990)  Trade  (1980s) 
 
Germany (vis-à-vis EC6 then EC12)    6%  21%  66% 
United States (vis-à-vis Canada & Mexico)  1%  2%  60% 
Japan (vis-à-vis Northeast Asia, ASEAN & India)  2%  3%  25% 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Moravcsik (1998), p. 495. 
 
 
We see that intra-regional trade in relation to GDP is much higher in Europe than in North 
America and East Asia. If we look at intra-industry trade, which is considered conducive to trade 
liberalization, Europe is ahead of North America and East Asia. But intra-industry trade is quite 
high in North America, too. This produces a ranking, where one should expect most demand for 
integration in Europe, followed by North America and with East Asia on a third place. 
Moravcsik summarizes: 
 
Bringing together these simple indicators … the political economy theory predicts very strong 
pressures for trade liberalization in Europe, more moderate pressure in North America, and 
very little pressure in East Asia. This is indeed what we observe.
24 
 
                                                           
24 Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, p. 495.   11  
He goes on to say “geopolitical theories have difficulty explaining this outcome.” He does admit, 
“these data are more suggestive than conclusive.” But, he says, “they do suggest that the primacy 
of political economy observed in postwar Europe is not just a contingent fact about Europe but a 
generalization about postwar industrial nations.”
25 He finishes the discussion by saying that “the 
comparative political economy of regionalism deserves more intensive study, beginning with the 
assumption that Europe and other regions face similar challenges and opportunities.” 
 
  
Towards a Political Economy Logic of Regional Integration: Mattli’s Contribution 
 
In Moravcsik’s short discussion of comparative regionalism emphasis is on the demand side. Walter 
Mattli has dealt with regional integration from a comparative perspective, comparing European 
experiences with experiences in other regions of the world. He also emphasizes the importance of 
supply factors, especially “the presence of an undisputed leader among the group of countries 
seeking closer ties:” 
 
Such a state serves as a focal point in the coordination of rules, regulations, and policies; it may 
also help to ease distributional tensions by acting as regional “paymaster”.
26  
 
Successful integration depends both on demand from market actors and supply from political 
actors. Willingness to supply integration “depends on the payoff of integration to political 
leaders.”
27 On the supply side both “commitment institutions” (such as the Commission and ECJ 
in Europe) and an institutional leader are considered important. In the German Zollverein the role 
of regional paymaster was played by Prussia. It is argued that Germany has played such a role in 
the EU. A central question on the supply side is how to overcome collective action problems 
associated with both Prisoners’ Dilemma and coordination games. There must be mechanisms to 
deal with the temptation of defection as well as distributional inequities.  
  Looking at integration in different regions of the world over time Mattli finds two puzzles: 
 
1.  Why have so many attempts at integration failed while a few have been crowned with 
success? 
 
2.  What explains when outsiders seek to become insiders? (Outsiders can become insiders 
either by joining an existing economic union or by creating their own regional group).
28 
 
  Once an integration scheme starts it will have external effects (externalities) because of 
discriminatory policies among the insiders. Outsiders may face trade and investment diversion, 
which will create demand for joining (the first integrative response) or creating an alternative 
scheme (the second integrative response). In Europe the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 
                                                           
25 Ibid, p. 496. In a footnote Moravcsik makes the following statement: “Although we can reject objective 
geopolitical circumstances as the source of preferences, we cannot entirely dismiss the role of ideas. Yet until ideas 
are clearly measured and more precisely theorized, claims for the importance of ideology and ideas cannot be more 
than speculative” (fn 26, ibid., p. 496). 
26 Walter Mattli, The Logic of Integration: Europe and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 
14. 
27 Ibid, p. 13. 
28 Ibid, p. 41.   12  
was an example of the second response in 1960. But eventually most EFTA countries joined the 
EC/EU, examples of the first integrative response.  
  
  Some integration schemes outside Europe, it is argued, can be seen as second integration 
responses to developments in Europe. The creation of the EEC in 1958 was a factor behind the 
Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) in 1960. Later, “efforts to deepen integration 
through the Single European Act raised fears of a “Fortress Europe,” triggering a veritable tidal 
wave of integration projects throughout the world in the late 1980s.” However, “none of the projects 
of the second integrative response type is guaranteed automatic success.” It all depends on whether 
the conditions are met. On the supply side absence of leadership can cripple integration (example 
the Andean Pact) and unwillingness to address distributional issues (such as in LAFTA) can 
undermine the prospects for integration.
29 
 
  Mattli has illustrated the varying outcomes of integration in a figure that we reproduce in 
slightly shortened form (Table 3). Leaving out some of the integration schemes studied by Mattli we 
notice that he has the EU, NAFTA and EFTA until 1973 with highest success rate (1973 was the 
year the UK and Denmark left EFTA to join the EC). The lowest success rate is given to the Central 
American Common Market (CACM) after 1969, ASEAN, the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), LAFTA and the Andean Pact (as well as the Carribbean Community 
and the Arab Common Market, which we have not included in the table). In the middle groups we 
find two contemporary schemes, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) and 
MERCOSUR. 
 
 
 
  Table 3: Outcomes of integration schemes 
 
    (Uncontested) regional leadership 
   Yes  No 
 
 
 
 
 
(Potential) market gains 
 
 
Relatively 
significant 
3 
EU 
NAFTA 
EFTA (until 
1973) 
2 
EFTA (after 
1973) 
APEC 
MERCOSUR 
from integration   
 
Relatively 
insignifican
t 
2 
CACM (until 
1969) 
1 
CACM (after 
1969) 
ASEAN 
ECOWAS 
LAFTA 
Andean Pact 
                      Success  rate:  3  highest 
                                                    1 lowest 
  Source: Adapted from Mattli (1999a), p. 66. 
                                                           
29 Ibid, pp. 63-64.   13  
  The Mattli framework for studying regional integration also has the clear advantage of 
simplicity, singling out a small number of variables as decisive for the success of integration. It pays 
equal attention to demand and supply factors. Among the things suggested by the scheme is the 
problem of leadership for schemes like MERCOSUR and APEC despite the presence of significant 
potential market gains from integration. Can and will Brazil be a leader in MERCOSUR? Can and 
will Japan - or the United States - be a leader in APEC? We also notice that Mattli does not see 
great prospects of integration among ASEAN countries, despite renewed integration efforts from 
1992.   
 
 
Degrees of Economic Integration 
 
Most – if not all - integration schemes involve economic integration. Economists distinguish 
between various stages of economic integration. Bela Balassa’s classic five steps of economic 
integration are given in table 4. 
Willem Molle has introduced some further distinctions, giving the following stages of 
economic integration: free trade area, incomplete customs union, customs union, incomplete 
common market, common market, economic union, monetary union, economic and monetary 
union, political union and full union. Political Union is reached when ‘integration is extended 
beyond the realm of economics to encompass such fields as anti-crime policy (police) and 
foreign policy, eventually including security policy.’ Full union involves ‘complete unification 
of the economies involved.’ A full union is likely to involve social security, income tax and 
macro-economic and stabilisation policy. The latter ‘implies a budget of sufficient size to be 
effective as an instrument of these policies.’   The end of the continuum thus is ‘some form of a 
confederation or federation’.
30 
 
 
Table 4: Balassa’s Categories of Economic Integration 
 No  Tariff 
 or Quota 
Common 
External 
Tariffs 
Free Flow 
of Factors 
Harmonization  
of Economic 
Policies 
Unification  
of Policies, 
Political  
Institutions 
Free Trade Area  X         
Customs Union  X  X       
Common Market  X  X  X     
Economic Union  X  X  X  X   
Total Economic Integration  X  X  X  X  X 
Source: Nye, 1971, p. 29. 
 
Applied to the different integration schemes in the world it is clear that the EU has 
progressed furthest. The Maastricht Treaty (1992) included the plan for Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU). Today 12 of 15 member states have introduced the single currency, the euro. The 
EU has not gone very far in the fiscal policy area, but the Stability Pact sets requirements for 
                                                           
30 Willem Molle, The Economics of European Integration: Theory, Practice, Policy, Second Edition (Dartmouth: 
Aldershot, 1994), p. 12.   14  
national fiscal policy. Some harmonisation of taxation policies has been tried, but with somewhat 
limited success. Taxation, including spending for social welfare, remains largely a national 
responsibility. The EU budget can maximum take 1.27 percent of the EU GDP. 
 
On the political side the EU deals with foreign, security and lately also defence policies 
as well as Justice and Home Affairs Co-operation, the latter including police co-operation. As 
such the EU has become a political union, but the EU remains rather weak in these political areas 
where the member states have been unwilling to transfer sovereignty to common institutions. 
Consensus or unanimity still dominates in ‘high politics’ areas and the Commission and ECJ gets 
less involved than in economic matters.  In many ways the EU can be compared with a federal 
state in economic areas, but not in the political areas, where the institutional set-up remains 
intergovernmental or ‘confederal’. 
 
Looking at integration in other parts of the world many integration efforts include at least 
efforts to create free trade. This is clearly the case of NAFTA, Mercosur and the Asean Free 
Trade Area (AFTA). Many of these efforts began – or restarted as second generation efforts - in 
the early 1990s and could be seen as responses to the internal market programme in Europe and 
to some extent the difficulties of concluding the Uruguay Round of the GATT. Facilitation of 
investments is often a part of these schemes, too. But most states hesitate more about free 
mobility of persons. The EU has realised the four freedoms as part of the internal market: free 
movement of goods, capital, services and persons. None of the other integration schemes have 
gone so far in establishing a common market, but at least the Mercosur aims in that direction. A 
more detailed comparison between existing integration schemes along the stages of economic 
integration could be an interesting research project. Finding out why some regions go further 
than other regions remains a central research question. To answer that question we need not only 
look at the interests of the participating countries but also the role of the common institutions 
created during the process and possibly other factors. 
 
 
International Regimes 
 
Integration schemes usually involve a certain degree of joint-decision making and the creation of 
some common institutions. As such they all involve the creation of regional international 
regimes. 
 
Back in the early 1980s Stephen Krasner gave what has become known as the consensus 
definition of international regimes: 
 
Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international 
relations.
31 
 
Regional integration schemes may well include more than one ‘given area of international 
relations.’ They may set out to create free trade, a customs union or a common market, as we 
                                                           
31 Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences,” p. 2.   15  
have seen. But they may also include co-operation related to security issues. Usually they affect 
expectations and political activities. Sometimes economic co-operation is most important, like in 
Mercosur and NAFTA. Sometimes security related co-operation precedes efforts to create free 
trade as happened in the case of ASEAN. Sorting out security related issues before economic 
integration started was also important in the case of Mercosur. In Europe, from the initial plans 
for a common market to Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) economics have taken a central 
place. Political co-operation developed slowly in parallel with economic integration, first 
through European Political Co-operation (EPC) from 1970, later through the EU’s second pillar, 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), introduced by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. But 
the original Schuman Plan in 1950, which started the process of integration in western Europe, 
was also very much motivated by security concerns, viz. the age old Franco-German problem. 
As the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman said at the time: 
 
By pooling basic production and by creating a new high authority whose decisions will be binding 
on France, Germany and the other countries who may subsequently join, this proposal will create 
the first concrete foundation for a European federation which is so indispensable for the 
preservation of peace.
32 
 
Comparing the different integration schemes, one difference remains striking: As already 
emphasized, the EC created stronger common institutions than other regions in the world have 
done. In the EU’s first pillar important powers have been delegated to the European Commission 
and the ECJ and decisions have increasingly been taken by a QMV in the Council of Ministers. 
 
When writing about international institutions in 1989 Robert Keohane argued that 
institutions affect states in three ways; 
 
1.  the flow of information and opportunities to negotiate; 
2.  the ability of governments to monitor others’ compliance and to implement their own 
commitments – hence their ability to make credible commitments in the first place; and 
3.  prevailing expectations about the solidity of international agreements
33 
 
The concept of credible commitments was later used by Andrew Moravcsik’s in his effort to 
explain institutional choice in the EU.
34 The EU has gone much further in pooling and delegating 
sovereignty than other integration schemes or wider international regimes such as the GATT. Is 
such pooling and delegation of sovereignty necessary to get credible commitments? Political 
leaders in other parts of the world have shied away from the bold step of delegating and pooling 
sovereignty. But can classical intergovernmental co-operation create ‘credible commitments’? 
  
In recent years we have seen an institutionalist turn in social sciences. ‘Institutions 
matter’ we are told. If so, different institutions presumably matter differently. Neo-functionalists 
have tended to be sceptical about the possibility of creating ‘credible commitments’ through 
classical intergovernmental institutions. 
 
                                                           
32 Schuman [1950] in S. Patijn, Landmarks in European Unity (Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1970), p. 49. 
33 Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Theory (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1989), p.2. 
34 Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe.   16  
Keohane suggested ‘institutional variation’ over three main kinds of institutions, viz. 
conventions, international regimes and international organisations. ‘Variations in degrees of 
institutionalization exert substantial effects on state behaviour,’ he said. Secondly, for an 
institutionalist perspective to be relevant, ‘the actors must have some mutual interests.’
35  
Supranational Polities 
 
To apply Keohane’s distinctions from 1989 to the EU we need to add some further distinctions. 
One of the EU’s founding fathers Jean Monnet mentioned the ‘negative experience of 
international co-operation, whose  institutions were incapable of decision-making.’ He therefore 
proposed ‘a joint sovereign authority’ for the first European Community, the ECSC in 1950.
36 
He also wanted to ‘abandon the unanimity rule in favour of a new system in which, to 
everybody’s advantage, the idea of the common interest would replace that of the national 
interest – or rather, the national interests of six separate countries.’
37 
 
None of the other integration schemes in the world have gone so far in the direction of 
giving common institutions ‘supranational’ powers. In that sense the EU is certainly sui generis, 
and some scholars have argued that the EU is more than an international regime (or international 
organisation), but less than a federal state.
38  
 
Writing about the EC in 1991 Keohane and Hoffmann echoed this: 
 
1.  The EC is best characterized as neither an international regime nor an emerging state 
but as a network involving the pooling of sovereignty. 
2.  The political process of the EC is well described by the term “supranationality” as used 
by Ernst Haas in the 1960s (although not as often used subsequently).
39 
 
At the same time, Keohane and Hoffmann did emphasise that ‘the EC has always rested on a set 
of intergovernmental bargains.’ 
 
In comparisons between the EU and other regional institutions we therefore need to add 
supranational institutions (or polities) to those mentioned by Keohane in 1989. Further on an 
institutional axis we could also add federal states. On Keohane’s other axis, mutual interest, we 
could use a rationalist game theoretic perspective, starting with conflicting interests (deadlock) 
over dilemmas of common interests (Prisoners’ dilemmas) via dilemmas of common aversions, 
especially co-ordination games with distribution problems (Battle of the Sexes) to situations of 
no conflict (harmony).
40 
                                                           
35 Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, p. 2. 
36 Jean Monnet, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1978), p. 295. 
37 Ibid, p. 353. 
38 William Wallace, “Less than a Federation, More than a Regime,” in H. Wallace, W. Wallace and C. Webb (eds.), 
Policy-Making in the European Community (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1983), pp. 403-436. 
39 Keohane and Hoffmann, “Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s,” p. 10. 
40 See especially, Arthur Stein, “Coordination and Collaboration in an Anarchic World,” International Organization, 
Vol. 36(2), 1982, pp. 299-324 and Krasner, “Global Communications and National Power,” but also Joseph M. 
Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” 
International Organization 42 (August 1988), pp. 485-507 and Duncan Snidal, “Relative Gains and the Pattern of 
International Cooperation,” American Political Science Review 85 (September 1991), pp. 701-726.   17  
The relation between these two axes is tricky. It may be curvy-linear. In Prisoners’ 
Dilemma situations good institutions are required to get Pareto-efficient solutions. Under the 
Battle of the Sexes institutions have to contribute to solving problems of distribution. In the case 
of Simple Co-ordination Games there are neither problems of defection nor distribution. So no 
regimes are needed. When there are fundamental conflicts of interests (Deadlock) no co-
operative institutions will emerge. Nor are they needed at the other end of the continuum in 
situations of harmony.  
 
What this latter axis suggests is that the configuration of interests (or preferences) 
structures different kinds of situations that affect the institutional requirements if joint decision-
making is to take place. The two fundamental situations requiring good institutions are the 
dilemmas of common interests, where the issue is one of reaching efficient solutions, and 
dilemmas of common aversions, where the problem is one of distribution.
41  
 
We have tried to summarise the essentials of the argument in Table 5. In pure conflict 
situations it is limited what institutions can do. Some convergence of interests will have to take 
place. At the other end harmony of interests require no institutionalisation. ‘Parallel unilateral 
action’ as advocated in East Asia and within APEC should be sufficient. The problem for AFTA 
and APEC is that harmony of interests does not necessarily exist. Domestic pressures have made 
it impossible for APEC to progress towards freer trade in sensitive areas. 
 
Simple co-ordination problems – like whether to drive on the left or right side of the road 
– require decisions, but no elaborate regimes. They are basically self-executing once decided 
upon. It is suggested that the so-called Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC) invented by the 
EU and applied to employment policy under the Amsterdam Treaty and a number of issues under 
the so-called Lisbon strategy of 2000, which set the strategic goal for the EU ‘to become the 
most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable 
economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.’ It is a good question, 
however, whether the problems the EU is trying to solve with the OMC are all simple co-
ordination problems. So far progress seems to have been limited. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
41 For a German discussion of how different game situations structure international relations, see 
Michael Zürn, Interessen und Institutionen in der internationalen Politik: Gundlegung und 
Anwendung des situationsstrukturellen Ansatzes (Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1992).   18  
Table 5: Nature of Issues and Institutional Requirements 
Nature of 
 Issue 
Conflicting 
interests/pure 
conflict 
Dilemmas of 
common 
interests (PD)
Temptation to 
defect 
Co-ordination    
problem with 
distributional 
issues  
Simple 
co-ordination 
problem 
Harmony of 
interests 
Institutional 
requirements 
Institutions 
to no avail 
Convergence 
of interests 
Required 
Pooling and 
delegation of 
sovereignty 
Sanctions 
against 
defection 
Pooling and 
delegation of 
sovereignty 
Budgetary 
means 
Open 
Method 
of Co- 
ordination 
(OMC) 
sufficient 
Institutionalisation 
not necessary 
‘Parallel unilateral 
action’ 
sufficient 
Source: Compiled by the author 
 
 
Used in a comparative perspective this raises the question whether other mechanisms 
than pooling and delegation of sovereignty can provide for ‘credible commitments’ when there 
are temptations to defect from agreements or distributional inequities follow from integration. 
The most obvious candidate for such a mechanism is leadership (or hegemony). There can be no 
doubt that leadership is in any case an important variable in processes of integration as 
underlined already by Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) and later by Mattli (1999). Thomas 
Pedersen has studied the role of France and Germany in the European integration process. These 
two countries have performed a kind of ‘co-operative hegemony’ he suggests (Pedersen, 1998). 
 
Multi-Level Governance 
  
In recent years the term ‘governance’ has emerged. Robert Keohane’s presidential address to the 
American Political Science Association in 2000 was entitled ‘Governance in a Partially 
Globalized World’.
42 International Relations scholars started talking about ‘governance without 
government’ in the international system in the early 1990s.
43 The term has also increasingly been 
used in relation to the EU.
44 Part of this literature puts emphasis on the multi-level nature of the 
EU polity.
45 The literature also discusses the problem-solving capacity of multi-level 
governance.
46 We shall not review this literature here. Suffice it to say that much of this literature 
has the ‘supranational’ EU level as an important level. In that sense there are some parallels to 
earlier neofunctionalist theories, which also saw the role of the European Commission and the 
ECJ as important.  
                                                           
42 Robert O. Keohane, “Governance in a Partially Globalized World,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 95, 
No. 1 (March 2001), pp. 1-13. 
43 James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds.), Governance without Government: Order and Change in World 
Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
44 Simon J. Bulmer, “The Governance of the European Union: A New Institutionalist Approach,” Journal of Public 
Policy,  Vol. 13, No. 4, 1994, pp. 351-380 and Markus Jachtenfuchs, “Theoretical Perspectives on European 
Governance,” European Law Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2 (July 1995), pp. 115-133. 
45 Gary Marks, Lisbet Hooghe and Kermit Blank, “European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. Multi-
Level Governance,” Journal of Common Market Studies,  Vol. 34, No. 3, 1996, pp. 341-378. 
46 Fritz W. Scharpf, “Introduction: The Problem-Solving Capacity of Multi-Level Governance,” Journal of 
European Public Policy, Vol. 4, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 520-538 and Fritz W. Scharpf, Governing in Europe: 
Effective and Democratic? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).   19  
 
Some of the governance literature puts emphasis on networks. Various scholars have 
based studies of particular policy studies on network approaches.
47 According to John Peterson 
the study of networks is particularly useful at the sub-systemic level.
48 Such networks also play a 
role in other parts of the world. Business leaders, especially, may form networks and put pressure 
on leaders to produce integration even short of strong common institutions, such as has been 
happening to some extent in the case of ASEAN.
49 But will such efforts last short of 
commitment institutions or undisputed leadership?  
 
The moment the EU polity starts resembling a federal system it can be studied on the 
basis of theories from comparative politics
50 and compared with federal systems.
51 It seems to us 
that such comparisons would not make so much sense for NAFTA, Mercosur or ASEAN. 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The EU is currently going through yet another treaty reform. A Convention of the Future of 
Europe is producing a ‘constitution’ for Europe.
52 The Convention is preparing another 
Intergovernmental Conference, which will finalise the new constitutional treaty of the EU in 
view of creating efficient and legitimate governance in a much enlarged EU. Ten new members 
have been accepted by the meeting of the European Council in Copenhagen in December 2002. 
If membership is accepted by referenda and confirmed by national parliaments in the applicant 
countries the EU may well have 15 new members in May 2004. This suggests that European 
integration has kept moving over the years, with ups and downs, but on balance expanding scope 
and deepening integration while also widening. The Schuman-Monnet initiatives in 1950 put 
Europe onto a new trajectory which has now reached the ‘constitutional’ phase. 
 
Scholarship on regional integration faces the challenge of developing more comparative 
research designs for additional empirical research. Back in the early years of integration studies 
Nye presented a comparative study.
53 More recently Mattli has done so as well.
54 But most 
existing studies are single case studies or comparisons of a couple of integration schemes. 
 
                                                           
47 See for instance,D. Marsh (ed.), Comparing Policy Networks (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998). 
48 John Petersen and E. Bomberg, Decision-Making in the European Union (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999). 
49 Kjell Eliassen and Catherine Børve Monsen, “Institutions and Networks: A Comparison of European and 
Southeast Asian Integration,” in Erik Beukel et al., Elites, Parties and Democracy: Festschrift for Professor Mogens 
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50 Simon Hix, The Political System of the European Union (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999). 
51 Carl J. Friedrich, Europe: An Emergent Nation (New York: Harper and Row, 1969); Alberta M. Sbragia, 
“Thinking about the European Future: The Uses of Comparison,” in Alberta SBragia (ed.), Euro-Politics: 
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54 Walter Mattli, “Explaining Regional Integration Outcomes,” Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 6(1) (March 
1999), pp. 1-27.   20  
Questions for further research include the role of interests and values, negotiations and 
institutions, and the impact of integration. More detailed comparative studies of the role of 
commitment institutions and leadership would especially be useful. Have second generation 
integration schemes turned out to be as resilient as predicted by some in the early 1990s? Or will 
they slip back as happened to many integration efforts in the 1970s? On this fundamental 
question the jury is still out. 
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